America’s Credit Card Shock: How a U.S. Policy Quake Threatens the Global Payments Order

For decades, the global card business treated the United States as its anchor: the market where consumers swipe the most, margins run the fattest, and regulators mostly leave pricing alone. That sense of stability cracked when President Donald Trump went on Truth Social and demanded a one‑year, 10 percent cap on U.S. credit card interest rates, saying the American public is being “ripped off” by companies charging 20 to 30 percent or more.​

In a single post, the U.S. government signaled it was willing to redraw the lines on how consumer credit works in its own market — and by extension, in much of the world. At the same time, Trump threw his weight behind the Credit Card Competition Act, legislation aimed squarely at breaking Visa and Mastercard’s tight control of U.S. card routing.​

For banks, this looks like a direct attack on profit. For Visa and Mastercard, it looks like the beginning of a fight over their business model. For merchants — especially those outside the U.S. trying to sell into it — it is a moment that could reshape costs, risk, and customer behavior all at once.​

The American Credit Engine Under Threat

U.S. credit cards are the engine of American household spending. Outstanding balances exceed $1.2 trillion, and average APRs hover around 21 to 22 percent, according to multiple industry and central bank datasets.​

Trump’s proposed 10 percent cap would slice deep into that revenue stream. Research from Vanderbilt University’s Policy Accelerator estimates a cap could save Americans on the order of $100 billion per year in interest, while also stripping tens of billions out of rewards and other card economics.​

JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon has called the potential impact “dramatic,” especially for riskier segments and co‑branded portfolios. Major trade groups representing card issuers warn that a cap would “diminish credit access and severely impact millions of American families and small business owners” who rely on cards. Some analyses suggest that under a strict cap, a large share of subprime accounts would simply vanish; the risk math would no longer work.​

For merchants, including international brands selling into the U.S., this kind of contraction would show up very quickly: fewer approvals, lower limits, and a more cautious American consumer — especially in discretionary and cross‑border spend.​

Where Visa and Mastercard Stand in the Crossfire

Visa and Mastercard do not set interest rates or issue most cards, but their networks sit in the middle of nearly every U.S. credit transaction. Their revenue is tied to transaction volume and swipe fees, not directly to APRs — yet the current political moment hits them from two angles.​

On the rate‑cap front, network executives have been careful. Publicly, they have mostly pointed out that they are payment networks rather than lenders, and analysts note that the cap would hit banks first. Privately, they understand that if banks pull back on credit, volume on their rails will suffer — particularly in high‑ticket and revolving categories that drive a disproportionate share of fee revenue.​

The bigger direct threat is the Credit Card Competition Act. Lawmakers sponsoring the bill describe Visa and Mastercard as a “duopoly” that controls about 80–85 percent of the U.S. credit card network market and “refuse to negotiate fair terms with Main Street merchants.” Senator Peter Welch says the “Visa‑Mastercard duopoly is killing small businesses in America” with “crushing interchange fees,” while Senator Dick Durbin argues that bringing “real competition to credit card networks” is essential to hold down costs.​​

Visa and Mastercard have pushed back through lobbying and industry messaging, warning that forced routing choice could undermine security, disrupt reliability, and weaken the rewards programs many American consumers value. They also point out that they provide global acceptance and fraud tools that alternative networks may struggle to match at scale.​

For merchants, the signal is clear: the two companies that have quietly set the rules of card acceptance in the U.S. for decades are now defending those rules in a very public, very political fight.​

Merchants Smell Opportunity — and Complexity

Merchant groups see this as the best chance in a generation to rebalance card economics. Swipe fees in the U.S. have jumped more than 70 percent since the pandemic, reaching nearly $190 billion in 2024, and are widely described as one of the fastest‑growing operating costs for retailers.​

The Credit Card Competition Act would require banks over a certain size to enable at least two unaffiliated networks on their cards — Visa or Mastercard plus another competitor, such as NYCE, Star, or Shazam. In practice, that could give merchants real leverage to route transactions over lower‑cost rails for U.S. cardholders, rather than accepting whatever fee structure the dominant networks dictate.​

For global merchants entering the U.S. market, this is a potentially transformative shift:

• The U.S., long one of the most expensive card markets to accept, could gradually move toward more competitive pricing.​

• Visa and Mastercard may be forced to sharpen their value proposition — with better tools, security, or pricing — as they compete to keep volume on their networks.​

• But taking advantage of the change will require more sophisticated routing, settlement, and risk management capabilities.​

The intensity of this moment stems from that duality. The same policies that might lower long‑run costs and open networks could also trigger short‑term turbulence in credit availability, rewards, and consumer behavior.​

A U.S. Fight With Global Shockwaves — And What to Do Now

Although this story is rooted in U.S. politics and regulation, it is fundamentally about the stability of the rails that carry payments around the world. Visa and Mastercard’s dominance in the American market, and the profitability of U.S. card lending, have long underwritten global investments and norms.​

If Congress and regulators move ahead with a meaningful cap or network competition, regulators elsewhere will be watching closely — and may feel emboldened to revisit card fees, routing, and competition in their own markets. If the effort stalls, networks and issuers could emerge with more political leverage, having survived a very public test.​

For merchants planning or expanding U.S. operations, this is not a moment to wait passively:

• Quantify your exposure to U.S. cards. Understand how much of your American revenue depends on credit versus debit and alternative methods, especially in cross‑border and recurring models.​

• Plan for tighter or more volatile credit. Model what happens to your sales if U.S. banks trim limits, approve fewer accounts, or high‑APR revolvers pull back.​

• Build for routing choice now. Even before any law passes, work with acquirers and processors that can support multiple U.S. networks and adjust routing dynamically as economics change.​

• Stay close to U.S. rewards and wallet trends. Changes in issuer economics or network fees could shift consumers toward debit, alternative wallets, or new installment products, affecting conversion at checkout.​

The remarkable thing about this moment is how quickly the unthinkable became negotiable. A Republican president is attacking high card rates and endorsing a bipartisan bill targeting the Visa‑Mastercard structure in the United States. Banks are warning of “devastating” effects. Networks are defending their role in the system.​

Merchants worldwide need to recognize that the American credit card model — long the most powerful demand engine in global commerce — is being rewritten in real time. The businesses that treat this as strategic terrain, will be the ones ready when the dust settles.